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ABSTRACT
The regulation of social work licensure and the associated rules governing social work practice
fall under the purview of the states. Each state has implemented different policies and
requirements governing social work licensure. Like many other helping professions, social
workers are largely governed by a state board that has the authority to impose sanctions for
violation of the established laws and rules. These sanctions are reported to the National
Practitioner Data Bank administered by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. Some research has been conducted on sanctioning trends of state boards; however, it is
limited in that only aspects related to practice have been examined. This study attempted to fill
these gaps by examining the influence that state-level political, socioeconomic, and regulatory
characteristics have on clinical social worker sanctions. A correlational, embedded mixed
methods design was utilized using secondary data from 48 U.S. states. Key findings suggest that
both state political and state socioeconomic variables are not good predictors of social worker
sanctions. Practice hours, a regulatory variable, was found to be a significant predictor for social
worker sanctions, with greater practice hour requirements correlated with greater sanctions. This
study’s results may inform further research on the influence of state social work regulatory
characteristics on sanctioning patterns.
Keywords: social work, regulation, licensing, sanctions, state policy, mixed methods
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
California enacted the first legislation regulating social work practice in the United States
in 1945. The act encouraged but did not require the registration of social workers. Similar
legislation would eventually sweep across the nation (Rutgers, 2008). Currently, no federal
system of regulation for the practice of social work exists. Consequently, the regulation of the
nearly 650,000 social workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics, n.d.) is primarily left to the states. As
such, each state has promulgated laws and regulations that govern practice.
The primary goal of social work licensure is to protect the public from unqualified
practitioners. Each state has a system in place to enforce the laws and regulations governing
social work practice. Individual social workers that violate the laws and rules of practice may
face sanctions by their respective state board (Association of Social Work Boards, 2015; GriseOwens, Owens, & Miller, 2016). States must report their sanctioning activities to the United
States Department of Health and Human Services; these data are recorded in the National
Practitioner Data Bank (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).
Existing studies have examined sanctions levied against social workers. The scope of
these studies are limited in that the primary focus is on the number and types of sanctions
reported by the states. (Boland-Prom, 2009; Boland-Prom, Johnson, & Gunaganti, 2015) These
studies do not address state socioeconomic, political, and regulatory factors (Boland-Prom,
Johnson, & Gunaganti, 2015). This study attempted to address existing gaps in the literature by
examining socioeconomic, political, and regulatory determinates of state sanctions for clinical
social workers.
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Research Objectives
This study addressed the following questions:
1) What is the relationship between state socioeconomic and political characteristics and state
regulatory characteristics?
2) What is the relationship between state socioeconomic characteristics and state sanctions
imposed on clinical social workers?
3) What is the relationship between state political characteristics and state sanctions imposed on
clinical social workers?
4) What is the relationship between state regulatory characteristics and state sanctions imposed
on clinical social workers?
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
In the United States, state governments regulate various professions ranging from
physicians and nurses to real estate agents and barbers. Following this pattern, the regulation and
licensing of social work practice are left to the states. The adoption of social work licensing and
practice laws varies significantly between the states. Each state can impose various requirements
to practice social work. As a result, multiple licensure levels have emerged: baccalaureate level,
graduate/generalist level, advanced-generalist level, and clinical level (Association of Social
Work Boards, 2014; Donaldson, Hill, Ferguson, Fogel, & Erickson, 2014). For this study, only
clinical level social work licensing was examined.

Clinical Licensing
The “highest” level of social work licensure/registration in the United States is the
clinical level license. The public is most familiar with this level of licensure. All 50 states have
implemented some form of licensure to regulate the practice of clinical social work. Whereas the
other forms of regulation are geared to the practice of social work at a generalist or macro level,
the clinical license aims to enable holders to, in most cases, provide psychotherapeutic services
to the public. The most common type of licensure at the clinical level is the Licensed Clinical
Social Worker (LCSW) (n = 30) (Association of Social Work Boards, 2016a; Donaldson, Hill,
Ferguson, Fogel, & Erickson, 2014).
Given the lack of continuity across jurisdictional boundaries, fully understanding social
work licensure is a complex endeavor. Currently, social workers must apply to and meet the
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requirements for each state in which they wish to practice. Many states allow social workers
already licensed in a state to qualify by endorsement, providing that the licensure requirements
between two states are similar (Donaldson, Hill, Ferguson, Fogel, & Erickson, 2014).

Adoption of Social Work Licensing Policies
The overarching purpose of social work licensure and regulation is to protect the public
from harm. This protection is accomplished through several avenues, namely by identifying the
standards for safe, professional practice. As a precursor to licensure, many states, such as
California in 1945, implemented a certification schema; however, this was limited. Social
workers at various educational and practice levels were grouped, and in some instances,
compliance with the policy was voluntary (Rutgers, 2008). Licensure laws emerged in the early
1960s, with Rhode Island denoting various levels of licensing. Since then, every state has
adopted social work licensing policies (Groshong, 2009).

Licensure Requirements
Four components of licensure that are common in most states are completion of a
master’s degree in social work from a program that is accredited by the Council on Social Work
Education, passing a licensing examination, and earning practice and supervision hours that need
to be completed before becoming licensed (Association of Social Work Boards, 2016a;
Association of Social Work Boards, n.d.a; Groshong, 2009). Generally, practice hours are
defined as the number of hours of experience social workers must obtain before applying for a
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clinical license (Groshong, 2009). Practice hours needed for licensure vary significantly, with
most states requiring between 2,000 and 6,000 hours to obtain a clinical license. States may also
impose additional requirements on practice hours, such as specifying the number of face-to-face
client contact hours that must be completed (Association of Social Work Boards, 2016a).
Like practice hours, the number of hours of clinical supervision varies across the states,
ranging from 72 to over 100 required hours (Groshong, 2009). Several states employ
supervision requirements that are proportional to the number of practice hours. In such
situations, one must complete n supervision hours per n practice hours. States also vary in their
modality of supervision, with most requiring some component of face-to-face supervision
(Association of Social Work Boards, 2014; Association of Social Work Boards, 2016a).

Licensure Oversight
Each state has some form of a quasi-jurisdictional board that implements the regulation
of social work practice. Generally, these types of boards come in three forms: a composite board,
an independent board, and an administrative oversight body. Independent boards consist solely
of social workers and regulate only the practice of social work. Composite boards may consist of
other mental or behavioral health providers or consumers. These boards often regulate the
practice of multiple professions. Administrative oversight indicates that a state agency or entity
oversees licensure activities. Currently, 12 states employ composite boards, 35 utilize
independent boards, and 3 have administrative agency oversight (Association of Social Work
Boards, 2016b; Groshong, 2009).
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Social Worker Sanctions
Many studies have examined ethical complaints filed against practicing social workers.
However, few studies examine the sanctioning practices of state regulatory boards (BolandProm, Johnson, & Gunaganti, 2015). Of the available studies, most focus on types of sanctions,
practitioner specialty, and practitioner demographics (Boland-Prom, 2009; Boland-Prom,
Johnson, & Gunaganti, 2015). This information is limited because it does not examine
socioeconomic, political, and regulatory contexts of practice. Furthermore, limitations in the
existing studies were noted as being unable to account for state-level policy differences (BolandProm, Johnson, & Gunaganti, 2015).
The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 amended titles
XI, XVIII, and XIX of the Social Security Act of 1935 to enhance the public’s protection from
unqualified healthcare practitioners. This action compelled states and their respective licensing
authorities to report specific actions to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, 2016; United States
Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). The National Practitioner Data Bank was
established to serve as a repository of this reporting data. Specifically, states are required to
report: adverse actions such as suspension or revocation of a license; closure or dismissal of a
formal proceeding if the practitioner voluntarily surrendered his/her license or moved out of
state; any loss of license due to voluntary surrender due to nonrenewal (exceptions are granted
for nonrenewal due to nonpayment of fees, movement to inactive status, or retirement); and any
adverse findings by a state licensing authority that is public record (exemptions are granted for
administrative fines unless they are directly related to the provision of healthcare services). All
6

actions reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank must result from formal proceedings
(United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2015).

Determinants
Boland-Prom, Johnson, and Gunaganti (2015) state that “variances in the types of
sanctioning patterns across states suggest that data are influenced by policy differences at the
state level.” (p. 135). However, the social work literature is void of studies that examine political
and socioeconomic determinants of sanctions. Logic suggests that political characteristics
influence states’ political processes; however, social and economic characteristics may be
equally or more influential (Lewis-Beck, 1977).

Socioeconomic Factors
Commonly examined socioeconomic characteristics of states include population and
income (Dye & Gray, 1980; Souvorova, 2011; Walker, 1969; Wood, 2011). These data are
typically obtained from the United States Census, given its relative reliability (Leon-Moreta,
2015).

Population
Population size directly influences state policies (Gray, 2018). The disparity in
population between the most populous and least populous states is vast, with some states having
populations larger than developed countries (Gray, 2018). Population size is a crucial indicator
7

as it impacts states’ resources and the demand for services. States with larger populations require
more investment in government services; however, they generally have a larger economy to
support the service demand. Conversely, smaller states may have fewer economic resources and
decreased service demand (Gray, 2018).

Income
Income is an essential indicator of state financial health as it directly impacts state
policies (Gray, 2018). Income can be measured in many ways, with per capita income being one
of the most commonly utilized in policy research. Per capita income is the strongest indicator of
state expenditures (Dye, 1976; Dye & McManus, 2012). Connecticut currently has the highest
per capita income, while Mississippi has the lowest (Gray, 2018).

Political Factors
Political determinants are measured various ways, with several studies measuring these
factors by means of political culture, interparty competition, and general policy liberalism
(Miller, 2004; Souvorova, 2011).

Political Culture
Political culture often influences the political climate as well as state policy initiatives.
Elazar (1970) defines political culture as “the particular pattern of orientation to political action”
(p. 256). Political culture is a set of values and attitudes, often directly unnoticed by the
8

populace, that shape political systems and thus individual and group behavior (Elazar, 1968;
Elazar, 1970). Generally, political culture can be viewed as three distinct subcultures:
individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic.
In the individualistic political culture, politics are viewed as a business-like entity playing
a role in a larger societal marketplace. With the primary focus being on private concerns,
government intervention is viewed as unnecessary and invasive unless achieving a commonly
agreed-upon goal. This political culture is more service rather than issue driven. In addition to
individualism, traits commonly found in this political culture may include patronage and some
tolerance for corruption (Elazar, 1968).
Conversely, the moralistic political culture emphasizes community and the
commonwealth ideal. In this subculture, the public good is held in high regard, with less
attention paid to individual needs. Issue-driven, the moralistic political culture lends itself to new
and innovative policy initiatives designed to craft a better society. Traits commonly associated
with the moralistic political culture include a moral obligation to political participation and a
clean and discourse friendly political arena (Elazar, 1968; Elazar, 1970).
The traditionalistic political culture, similar to individualistic political culture, is skeptical
of government and views its intervention in society as limited. The primary social emphasis is
placed on social and family ties, with much less emphasis placed on personal connections. The
traditionalistic political culture seeks to maintain the status quo, with a small group of ruling
elites functioning as the primary decision-makers and power brokers. Political participation by
those outside of the elite class is often marginalized (Elazar, 1968).
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Building upon the work of Elazar (1968), Sharkansky (1969) developed a scale of state
political cultures. In doing so, Sharkansky (1969) provides a scale that accomplishes three
primary goals: examining the relationship between state political culture and the associated
contingent variables, controlling for compounding variables that may be common to political
culture and its contingent variables, and controlling for regional relationships that may influence
political culture.
Clynch (1972) questions the conclusions drawn by Sharkansky (1969). It is argued that in
developing the scale of political culture, Sharkansky (1969) did not account for regional
relationships that may impact state political culture (Clynch, 1972). Additionally, the nature of
Sharkansky’s scale limits the influence of individualistic state characteristics as states are
classified on a spectrum from moralistic to traditionalistic (Johnson, 1976; Souvorova, 2011).
Johnson (1976) examined state political culture using eight political indicators finding six
significant, thereby linking state political characteristics to political culture. The classification
system developed by Elazar (1968) has shown to have a reasonably high degree of reliability in
more recent studies (Souvorova, 2011; Wirt, 1991). More recently, Lieske (2010) developed a
multidimensional scale to measure overall state culture. The political culture classification
developed by Elazar (1968) and enumerated by Sharkansky (1969) was paired with other
indicators such as state racial/ethnic diversity and social capital. Measuring various indicators,
the multidimensional scale provides a holistic view of a state’s overall culture. Relating
specifically to political culture, the multidimensional scale correlates with Sharkansky’s scale
(Lieske, 2010; Lieske, 2012).
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Political culture has been found to impact human and social services (Bielefeld & Corbin,
1996). Policy differences emerge in some states based on their political culture. For example,
moralistic states tend to spend more on social services programs than individualistic and
traditionalistic states (Bielefeld & Corbin, 1996). Policy outcomes may also be contingent on
state political culture. In one such study examining adoption policies, Trabing (2015) found that
individualistic states had different policy outcomes than moralistic and traditionalistic states.
These findings may suggest that political culture is an essential indicator of state policy adoption
and outcomes; however, it is not the sole determinant (Bielefeld & Corbin, 1996; Miller, 2004;
Trabing, 2015).

Interparty Competition
Interparty competition impacts state policy “with competitive states tending to spend
more on social programs than states with weak interparty competition” (Holbrook & La Raja,
2018, p. 86). Additionally, more competitive state political environments are positively
associated with voter turnout. There are multiple ways to measure electoral competition within
each state, with one of the most conspicuous being interparty competition (Brace & Jewett,
1995). Ranney (1976) developed an index to measure interparty competition by examining three
dimensions: the proportion of success, duration of success, and divided control frequency.
According to Ranney (1976), the proportion of success refers to “the percentage of the votes won
by each party for statewide offices and the percentage of seats in the legislature held by each” (p.
59). Duration of success measures the time each political party controls state offices or the
legislature. The frequency of divided control is the time party control has been divided between
11

the legislature and governorship (Ranney, 1976). The index ranges from zero, representing total
Republican control, to one indicating complete Democratic control. The midpoint value, 0.5,
indicates a high degree of political competitiveness within the state (Shufelt & Flavin, 2011;
Souvorova, 2011). Souvorova (2011) notes that the index has been updated multiple times since
its initial iteration. The use of the Ranney Index is meritorious; however, it is limited. The index
focuses solely on state offices while neglecting the impacts of interparty competition at other
levels of government. The weighting schema between state offices, such as the legislature and
governorship, is not balanced, giving more weight to the state legislature. Finally, the index is a
snapshot and cannot adequately address political changes that may occur during the data
collection period (Holbrook & La Raja 2018; Ranney, 1976).

General Policy Liberalism
General policy liberalism attempts to measure a state’s willingness to adopt liberal
policies and is composed of six unique variables developed by Klingman and Lammers (1984).
Bridging from Klingman and Lammers (1984) general policy liberalism factor, Gray and Jacob
(1996) created an index of policy liberalism based on five indicators: gun control policies,
abortion laws, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) eligibility, tax progressivity,
and unionization. The overall policy liberalism index, as developed by Gray and Jacob (1996),
ranks states from one to 50, with one being the most generally liberal state, and 50 being the
most conservative. Gray (2018) cautions that general policy liberalism can be misleading in that
every state does not uniformly adopt liberal or conservative policies across all five indicators.
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It is noted that Grey and Jacob (1996) did not develop a general policy liberalism index
for 1990. As discussed in later chapters, the average ranking for the five indicators was used in
lieu of the index.

Implementation Research
Many studies examining socioeconomic and political determinants of policy have a
primary focus on policy enactment and not implementation (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016).
Implementation is the process by which a state policy decision is carried out (Sabatier, 1980).
Policy implementation research examines the stated or intended goal of the policy or policies, the
inherent structure that must be present to execute the policy, and several variables that may
impact the execution (Bardach, 1997; Elmore, 1980; Sabatier, 1980). The overarching goal of
social work policies at the state level is to protect the public from harm by unqualified
practitioners (Groshong, 2009). Embedded within state laws are the specific policies that direct
the implementation of the protection mandate. These policies address social work practice and
supervision hour requirements for licensure and the type of board established to oversee the dayto-day implementation of the policy (Groshong, 2009). Other factors that may influence policy
implementation are socioeconomic and political conditions within a state (Sabatier, 1980).
Socioeconomic and political factors are powerful influencers as they impact implementation and
adoption and policy outcomes (McDonnell & Weatherford, 2016).
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The development of the theoretical framework for this study was based on Easton’s
(1953) concept of a political system. This study also draws from internal determinate models
developed by Berry (1994), Dye (1966), and Miller (2004).

Political Systems
The concept of a political system was first proposed by Easton (1953). At the most basic
level, Easton (1957) postulates that politics and, thus, the political system “is concerned with
understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society” (p. 383). When
viewed broadly, the political and policymaking spheres have many different actors, stakeholders,
and components. The concept of a political system encompasses all of these aspects and is
inclusive of all political interactions. It may appear that elements of the political system operate
independently, segregated from other components; however, Easton argues otherwise. Each
aspect of politics and the policymaking process does not stand in isolation; it is inherently linked
to the larger process and the other components of the political process (Easton, 1957).
Furthermore, the larger external environment influences various aspects of the system.
This external environment consists of the social and economic systems that extend beyond the
boundaries of the political system (Anyebe, 2018). To illustrate the political system and the
influence of the external environment, Easton (1957) poses the following blueprint “inputs –
political system or processes – outputs” (p. 384). Figure 1 illustrates this blueprint.
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Demands
Input
Support

A Political
System

Decisions
Policies

Output

s

s
Feedback
Figure 1: A Political System, Easton (1957)

As Figure 1 illustrates, Easton (1957) notes the relationship between the external
environment, inputs, the political system, outputs, and cyclical feedback. Inputs are broken into
two distinct categories, demands, and support. Outputs can be viewed as the decision or policies
the political system makes or implements, based on the inputs. This reliance on inputs and
outputs is an inherent limitation of a political system (Shirin, Bogolubova, Nikolaeva, 2014).
As noted, Easton (1957) classifies inputs into two broad domains, demands and support.
Easton notes that these inputs allow the political system to operate dynamically, thereby
responding to the needs of changing environments. Demands are the collective desires that the
external environment, its actors and stakeholders, deem warrants a response from the political
system. These may include but are not limited to the provision of services, regulation of sectors
or professions, or the regulation of public behavior. These demands are usually made to satisfy
the needs and values of stakeholders (Anyebe, 2018). Demands are potent agents of change to
the political system and can influence the very behavior of the system. In a sense, demands form
the basis on which the political system operates. As the larger environment changes, so do the
demands, bringing change to the political system (Easton, 1957).
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Support is the other stream of inputs that keeps the political system functioning. Support
may be viewed as a positive response towards a political system. Easton (1957) notes that
support may come in various ways, including overt actions such as voting for a particular
candidate or covert actions such as having a supportive state of mind that may manifest in such a
way as loyalty to a political party. These supportive states of mind are vital inputs to the
continuous function and upkeep of a political system. The amount of support that a political
system has can be linked to its perceived legitimacy (Anyebe, 2018).
The decisions that a political system makes are referred to as outputs. These come in
various forms, such as laws, regulations, and rules (Anyebe, 2018; Shirin, Bogolubova,
Nikolaeva, 2014). As Anyebe (2018) notes, outputs are the “authoritative allocations of values”
(p. 8) and, as such, a form of public policy. The outputs of a political system are vital as they can
influence the larger external environment (Easton, 1957).
Feedback is also an important concept when viewing a political system. It allows the
political system to exist over time and evolve as the external environment evolves (Anyebe,
2018; Easton, 1953). As an example, a political system may produce an output based on a set of
inputs. The output may alter the external environment in that it changes the inputs (the demands
and support) and provides this feedback to the political system. In response, the political system
may produce new outputs (Anyebe, 2018).

The Application of Easton’s Political System Model to State Policy Studies
Drawing on the work of Easton (1957), Dye (1966) developed state policy studies
that examine mechanisms that may influence political systems, commonly termed determinants
16

or internal determinants. As Miller (2004) notes, “Dye (1966) proposes that socioeconomic
development variables influence political system characteristics, yielding policy outcomes” (p.
36). Of the socioeconomic development variables, Dye and Gray (1980) note that state
population and state per capita income are two of the more influential socioeconomic variables,
with Miller (2004) asserting that socioeconomic determinants, in general, heavily impact policy
outcomes. The socioeconomic determinants identified by Dye and Gray (1980) speak to the
environment and inputs that Easton (1957) notes in his description of a political system. Utilizing
determinants within the context of a political system allows for an assessment of the
consequences of public policy (Dye, 1979).
In a study examining educational policy outcomes, Dye (1967) discusses the utility of
Easton’s political system, noting that systems approaches to research have the potential for
impactful contribution. Dye (1967) slightly adapts Easton’s model to better address specific
policy outcomes related to education. Figure 2 presents Dye’s adapted model of a political
system.
Inputs

Socio-economic
Development
Variables

D

Political

A

System
Characteristics
of Political
Systems

E

Output

B

s
Educational
Policy
Outcomes

C

Figure 2: Modified Political System, Dye (1967)
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In this model, Dye (1967) explores the role that a political system and its inherent
characteristics play in influencing policy outcomes. Dye (1967) postulates that two options may
exist. The first states that policy outcomes are determined by socioeconomic factors with
negligible influence from the political system. In Figure 2, this is illustrated with the interaction
with nexus ‘C’. With the second noting that the political system serves as a mediator between the
socioeconomic inputs and the policy outcomes. This is noted by nexus ‘A’ and ‘B’ in Figure 2.
Both of these options illustrate the influence of socioeconomic determinants.
Studying inequality and civil rights policies in the states, Dye (1969) continues with his
utilization of a determinants model framed within the concept of a political system. In this, Dye
(1969) examined how inequality measures paired with select socioeconomic and political
characteristics, such as party competition and income impacted policy outcome measures. Dye
(1969) found the various determinants to be strong predictors of policy outcomes.
In another study using a determinants model, Ness and Tandberg (2013) examine capital
expenditures on higher education, with specific attention paid to the various determinants of state
spending. Ness and Tandberg (2013) primarily examined political determinants such as political
party control, gubernatorial power, and legislative professionalism. State socioeconomic and
demographic determinant variables were included in this study in a secondary manner. Ness and
Tandberg (2013) note that various political and socioeconomic determinants were statistically
significant predictors of capital expenditures on higher education.
Matisoff (2008) utilizes a determinants model to assess the adoption of state climate
change policies. Some determinants are specifically related to climate change, such as solar
density and wind potential, while others are more traditionally aligned with policy determinants,
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such as citizen ideology. Through multiple analyses, Matisoff (2008) found that state
characteristics, those akin to determinants, strongly drive climate change policies.

Internal Determinant Model
Internal determinant models focus on state-specific factors such as socioeconomic and
political characteristics and their impact on state policy adoption (Berry, 1994; Miller, 2004).
Socioeconomic factors typically include but are not limited to state income, economic
conditions, and employment rates (Dye & Gray, 1980). In contrast, political characteristics may
consist of political culture, party competition, party control, and other state-level governmental
attributes (Miller, 2004). Internal determinant models are limited in that they view the state as a
singular organism, thereby negating the impact that nearby states’ policy innovations may have
(Berry, 1994).

Input-Output Model
Input-output models are useful tools for analysis as they complement policy formation
and adoption (Baumol & Wolff, 1994). Rooted in economics, input-output models are
descriptive and prescriptive (Christ, 1955). Finley (2002) utilizes an input-output model to
examine the State of Florida’s foster care and child welfare systems. In this, the overarching
“problem” in Finley’s research can be examined not only by the result or output but also by
influencing factors.
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A Conceptual Model for Social Work Sanctioning
The internal determinant model described by Miller (2004) does not conceptualize
beyond policy adoption. Thus, policy implementation is neglected. The traditional input-output
model suffers from a similar pitfall (Baumol & Wolff, 1994). Woods (2004) hypothesizes that
state political and economic characteristics can influence policy implementation and, more
specifically, the rulemaking process. This is supported by several notions from the concept of a
political system, as described by Easton (1957). The external environment in the political system
model influences the inputs, which drives the political system to craft outputs as a response.
Outputs, then having the potential to alter the external environment, may influence inputs
through the feedback process (Anyebe, 2018; Easton, 1957). Given this, a conceptual model used
for examining state sanctioning patterns for clinical social workers should account for internal
determinants at the policy adoption phase and during the implementation phase. The traditional
input-output model can be extended to incorporate implementation or process, which may link to
a political system’s inner workings. In this conceptual model, internal determinants (state
socioeconomic and political variables) serve as inputs, with state regulatory variables used to
measure implementation and the number of state sanctions imposed on clinical social workers
being outputs. The underlying assumption being that inputs (state socioeconomic and political
variables) influence process (state regulatory variables), which impacts the output (Dye, 1967).
However, as the input-output model suggests, inputs may directly impact outputs (Stevens,
Treyz, & Kindahl, 1981). In this instance, state socioeconomic and political variables may
directly influence state sanctioning patterns for clinical social workers. Figure 3 illustrates a
conceptual model for analyzing social work sanctioning patterns.
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Inputs

Implementation

Socioeconomic Variables
--Population
--Income
Political Variables
--Political culture
--Interparty competition
--General policy liberalism
Control Variables
--Year of licensing law
--Number of licensed
SWs

Regulatory Variables
--Practice hours
--Supervision hours
--Board composition

Figure 3: Conceptual Model for Analysis
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Outputs

Number of reported
sanctions

CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY
This study employed a non-experimental, correlational, embedded mixed methods
design. Secondary data were utilized for this study. The embedded mixed methods design was
selected as it allowed for the examination of both quantitative and qualitative data within a
conventional quantitative design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The purpose of this study was
to determine the relative influence of socioeconomic, political, and regulatory characteristics on
state sanctions imposed on licensed clinical social workers. The quantitative aspects of this study
were divided into four parts. The research questions and corresponding hypotheses for each part
are identified below:

Part I – The Influence of Determinant Variables on Clinical Social Work Practice Hours
RQ-I: What is the relationship between state political and socioeconomic characteristics and
state clinical social work practice hour requirements?
H-IA: State population is positively associated with state social work clinical practice hour
requirements.
H-IB: State per capita income is positively associated with state social work clinical practice hour
requirements.
H-IC: State political culture is negatively associated with state social work clinical practice hour
requirements.
H-ID: State interparty competition is positively associated with state social work clinical practice
hour requirements.
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H-IE: State general policy liberalism is negatively associated with state social work clinical
practice hour requirements.
State population was hypothesized to be positively associated with clinical practice hour
requirements (hypothesis IA), as states with larger populations generally have larger governments
and more significant investments in government services. (Gray, 2018). As state per capita
income is a marker of state financial health and state expenditures (Dye & McManus, 2012;
Gray, 2018), state per capita income was hypothesized to be positively associated with state
clinical social work practice hour requirements (hypothesis IB). Political culture was
hypothesized to be negatively associated with practice hour requirements (hypothesis I C), as
states with a traditionalistic political culture tend to prefer limited government intervention and
regulation (Elazar, 1968). Interparty competition was hypothesized to be positively associated
with clinical practice hours (hypothesis ID) as states that lean towards Democratic control tend to
favor more governmental regulation (Holbrook & La Raja, 2018). Finally, the relationship
between state general policy liberalism and practice hour requirements (hypothesis I E) was
hypothesized as negative as the general policy liberalism index ranks states with the most liberal
policies as one and the most conservative as 50 (Gray, 2018). States with more liberal policies
may favor greater government regulation.

Part II – The Influence of Determinant Variables on Clinical Social Work Supervision
Hours
RQ-II: What is the relationship between state political and socioeconomic characteristics and
state clinical social work supervision hour requirements?
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H-IIA: State population is positively associated with state clinical social work supervision hour
requirements.
H-IIB: State per capita income is positively associated with state social work clinical supervision
hour requirements.
H-IIC: State political culture is negatively associated with state clinical social work supervision
hours.
H-IID: State interparty competition is positively associated with state clinical social work
supervision hour requirements.
H-IIE: State general policy liberalism is negatively associated with state clinical social work
supervision hour requirements.
Similar to the hypotheses for clinical social work practice hours, the relationship between
state population and clinical social work supervision hours was hypothesized to be positive
(hypothesis IIA) as states with larger populations may have larger governments and more
significant investment in government services (Gray, 2018). State per capita income was
hypothesized to be positively associated with supervision hours (hypothesis IIB), given that state
per capita income is a marker of state financial health (Gray, 2018) and is often an indicator of
state expenditures (Dye & McManus, 2012). State political culture and state clinical supervision
hours were hypothesized to be negatively associated (hypothesis IIC) as states with a
traditionalistic political culture tend to prefer limited government intervention and regulation
(Elazar, 1968). As states that lean towards Democratic control tend to favor more governmental
regulation (Holbrook & La Raja, 2018), state interparty competition was hypothesized to be
positively associated with state clinical social work supervision hours (hypothesis IID). State
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general policy liberalism was hypothesized to be negatively associated with clinical social work
supervision hours (hypothesis IIE), given that states with more liberal policies may implement
more regulations (Gray, 2018).

Part III – State Preferences of Social Work Board Composition
RQ-III: What types of social work boards do states prefer?
H-IIIA: States with larger populations prefer independent boards.
H-IIIB: States with higher per capita income prefer independent boards.
H-IIIC: States with a traditionalistic political culture prefer independent boards.
H-IIID: States with high levels of interparty competition prefer composite boards.
H-IIIE: States with higher levels of policy liberalism prefer independent boards.
It was hypothesized that states with larger populations prefer independent boards
(hypothesis IIIA), as more populous states generally have larger governments (Gray, 2018).
Similarly, it was hypothesized that states with higher per capita income levels also prefer
independent social work boards (hypothesis IIIB). Per capita income is linked to financial health,
and states with higher per capita income levels have greater resources at their disposal (Dye &
McManus, 2012). States with a traditionalistic political culture were hypothesized to prefer
independent social work boards (hypothesis IIIC). States with this political culture tend to favor
less regulation and a more limited role of government (Elazar, 1968). States with higher
interparty competition levels were hypothesized to prefer composite social work boards
(hypothesis IIID), as a more competitive political environment may yield more compromise in
policy (Holbrook & La Raja, 2018). States with higher levels of general policy liberalism were
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hypothesized to prefer independent social work boards (hypothesis IIIE), as states with more
liberal policies may tend to favor greater government regulation (Gray, 2018).

Part IV – The Influence of Determinant Variables on State Sanctions Imposed on Clinical
Social Workers
RQ-IV: What is the relationship between state socioeconomic characteristics and state sanctions
imposed on clinical social workers?
H-IVA: State population is positively associated with state sanctions imposed on clinical social
workers.
H-IVB: State per capita income is positively associated with state sanctions imposed on clinical
social workers.
It was hypothesized that state population (hypothesis IVA) and state per capita income
(hypothesis IVB) were positively associated with state sanctions imposed on clinical social
workers. Generally, states with larger populations have larger governments and more extensive
governmental services (Gray, 2018). Additionally, states with larger populations may have a
greater demand for clinical social workers. States with higher per capita income levels are
generally viewed to have more robust financial health while having elevated state expenditures
(Dye & McManus, 2012).
RQ-V: What is the relationship between state political characteristics and state sanctions
imposed on clinical social workers?
H-VA: State political culture is negatively associated with state sanctions imposed on clinical
social workers.
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H-VB: State interparty competition is positively associated with state sanctions imposed on
clinical social workers.
H-VC: State general policy liberalism is negatively associated with state sanctions imposed on
clinical social workers.
It was hypothesized that state political culture was negatively associated with state
sanctions (hypothesis VA). Those states with a moralistic political culture may be more open to
levying sanctions on clinical social workers, as they aim to craft a better society and may view
regulation as a route to achieving this goal (Elazar, 1968; Elazar, 1970). Interparty competition
was hypothesized to be positively associated with state sanctions (hypothesis V B), as states with
more Democratic control tend to favor more government regulation (Holbrook & La Raja, 2018).
It was also hypothesized that state general policy liberalism was negatively associated with state
sanctions imposed on clinical social workers (hypothesis VC). The general policy liberalism
index ranks states with the most liberal policies as one and the most conservative as 50 (Gray,
2018). States with more liberal policies may favor greater government regulation.
RQ-VI: What is the relationship between state regulatory characteristics and state sanctions
imposed on clinical social workers?
H-VIA: Practice hour requirements are negatively associated with state sanctions imposed on
clinical social workers.
H-VIB: Supervision hour requirements are negatively associated with state sanctions imposed on
clinical social workers.
H-VIC: Board composition is negatively associated with state sanctions imposed on clinical
social workers.

27

It was hypothesized that practice hour requirements (hypothesis VIA), supervision hour
requirements (hypothesis VIB), and social work board composition (hypothesis VIC) were all
negatively associated with sanctions imposed on clinical social workers. With limited literature
in this area, it is logical to assume that more clinical training via higher practice hour
requirements and more time spent receiving clinical supervision may lead to lower levels of
sanctions. Additionally, states with composite social work boards may levy fewer sanctions on
social workers as they also have regulatory responsibility for other professions.

Population
This study deals with a population, not a sample. All 50 states regulate social work
practice and have some reporting mechanism for sanctions imposed on practitioners. For this
study, Alaska and Hawaii were excluded, given that several of the political predictor variables
were unavailable for these states.

Data Collection
This study used secondary data. Social worker sanctioning data was obtained from the
United States Department of Health National Practitioner Data Bank, which aggregates sanctions
between 1990 and 2018. Data for socioeconomic factors were obtained from the United States
Census, using data from 1990. Political factors were obtained from various sources, with the
measure for political culture being sourced from the scale developed by Sharkansky (1969);
interparty competition and general policy liberalism obtained from Gray and Jacob (1996). No
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scale was available for general policy liberalism using data that predated 1990. As such, the
average state ranking for gun control laws, abortion access, social assistance accessibility, and
tax progressivity state laws as reported by Gray and Jacob (1996) were utilized. Data regarding
social work board composition and licensing requirements were obtained from the respective
state website and through the Association for Social Work Boards. Data indicating the year of
social work licensure adoption was sourced from Groshong (2009).

Variables and Measurement
The state was the unit of analysis. The outcome variables for Parts I, II, and III were state
social work clinical practice hours, state social work clinical supervision hours, and state social
work board composition. The outcome variable for Part IV was the number of sanctions reported
on clinical social workers and the sanctioning rate (number of sanctions per 100 social workers).
For Parts I – III, independent variables were grouped into two categories: 1)
socioeconomic variables and 2) political variables. For Part IV, independent variables were
grouped into three categories: 1) socioeconomic variables, 2) political variables, and 3)
regulatory variables. Socioeconomic variables included state population and per capita income.
Political variables included political culture, interparty completion, and general policy liberalism.
Regulatory variables included practice hours, supervision hours, and board composition. Control
variables included the number of licensed clinical social workers in each state and the year of
licensure law adoption. As the dependent variable is count data beginning in 1990, the
independent variables used data collected in 1990 or earlier to preclude temporal issues. Table 1
presents the variables included in this study.
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Table 1: Data Dictionary
Variable

Classification

Number of
sanctions

Continuous

Sanctioning rate

Continuous

State population

Measure
Source
Outcome Variables
Coded
NPDB
continuously

Coded
NPDB &
continuously
State
Socioeconomic Independent Variables
Continuous
Coded
US Census
continuously

State per capita
income

Continuous

Political culture

Continuous

Interparty
Competition

Continuous

Interval scale

Policy liberalism

Continuous

Index

Social work
practice hours

Social work
supervision hours

Licensure
oversight

Number of
clinical social
workers
Year of licensure
law

Coded
continuously

US Census

Political Independent Variables
Interval scale
Sharkansky
(1969)
Gray &
Jacob
(1996)

Definition
Number of social worker
sanctions as reported to NPDB
(1990 – 2018)
Number of sanctions per 100
social workers
1990 state population estimate
according to the US Census
Per capita income in 2015
adjusted dollars with data
collected in 1990
State political culture as defined
by an interval scale by
Sharkansky (1969)
Interparty competition using the
index developed by Ranney
(1976) and updated by Gray &
Jacob (1996)
Average ranking of five state
indicators as noted by Gray &
Jacob (1996)

Gray &
Jacob
(1996)
Regulatory Outcome/Independent Variables
Continuous
Coded
State/ASWB The minimum number of practice
continuously
hours required to obtain a social
work license as reported by the
state/ASWB (2018)
Continuous
Coded
State/ASWB The minimum number of
continuously
supervision hours required to
obtain a license as reported by
the state/ASWB (2018)
Count/Categorical
Count/Coded by
State/ASWB Type of licensure oversight as
number
defined by ASWB: independent
board, composite board, or
administrative agency (2018)
Control Variables
Continuous
Coded
State/ASWB The number of licensed clinical
continuously
social workers in each state with
data obtained from the State and
ASWB (2018)
Continuous
Coded
Groshong
The year that social work
continuously
(2009)
licensing laws were passed in
each state according to Groshong
(2009)
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Outcome Variable (Sanctions)
This study’s outcome variable was the number of clinical social workers who received
sanctions from the state oversight entity. This variable is continuous, with data obtained from
the National Practitioner Data Bank administered by the United States Department of Health and
Human Services. The National Practitioner Data Bank serves as a storehouse for healthcare
entities and medical professionals. Various entities such as malpractice payers, health plans,
licensing agencies, and state boards report disciplinary action to the National Practitioner Data
Bank. The National Practitioner Data Bank classifies sanctions based on types such as dual
relationships and unprofessional conduct (Boland-Prom, Johnson, & Gunaganti, 2015). The
current dataset includes data collected from 1990 to 2018 (United States Department of Health
and Human Services, n.d.). Sanctioning rate was also utilized as a dependent variable. This
variable was calculated as the total number of sanctions per 100 clinical social workers in each
state.

Socioeconomic Independent Variables

State Population
State population, a continuous variable, was taken from United States Census data on
1990 population estimates. Population data from 1990 was utilized as this predates the dependent
variable, avoiding temporal issues.
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Income
State per capita income is continuous, reflected in 2015 U. S. dollars as reported by the
United States Census with data from 1990. As with population, per capita income data from
1990 was utilized to avoid temporal issues.

Political Independent Variables

Political Culture
Political culture is a continuous variable using the framework developed by Elazar
(1968). Sharkansky (1969) quantified the framework developed by Elazar (1968) by creating a
scale of state political cultures. Values on this scale range from one to nine, with one indicating a
completely moralistic political culture, five indicating an individualistic political culture, and
nine indicating a wholly traditionalistic political culture. For example, Minnesota has a value of
one, indicating a moralistic political culture. Nevada with a value of five, denotes an
individualistic political culture. Arkansas, with a value of nine, has a traditionalistic political
culture. The data for this variable are interval.

Interparty Competition
Interparty competition measures the proportion of control of government between the
Republican and Democratic parties within state offices. Data for this variable were measured
using the Ranney Index as initially defined by Ranney (1976) and updated by Grey and Jacob
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(1996). Potential values range from zero to one, with zero indicating complete Republican
control and one representing total Democratic control. A value of .500 indicates a highly
competitive political environment with control being split between the two major parties
(Holbrook & La Raja, 2018). By way of example, in 1990, Utah had a value of 0.232 indicating
Republican dominance, while Indiana had a value of 0.518 indicating a competitive political
environment, and Louisiana, with a value of 0.828, illustrated Democratic dominance. The index
updated by Grey and Jacob (1996) utilized interparty competition data from 1990.

General Policy Liberalism
General policy liberalism indicates the state’s willingness to adopt liberal policies. The
general policy liberalism factor was created by Klingman and Lammers (1984), with Gray
(2018) modifying it into an index based on five indicators: gun laws, abortion laws, TANF
application requirements, tax progressivity, and state unionization. As Gray and Jacob (1996) did
not develop the index for 1990, the average state ranking for the five indicators was utilized.
States are ranked from one to 50, with lower numbers indicating a more disposition to adopt
liberal policies. For example, in 1990, West Virginia was regarded as the most liberal with a
score of one, while Texas was regarded as the most conservative with 50.
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Regulatory Outcome/Independent Variables

Practice Hours
Practice hours represent the number of post-graduate hours of practice a social worker
must earn before becoming licensed. These hours represent the total number of experience hours
needed for licensure versus the total number of direct contact hours (Association of Social Work
Boards, 2016a; Groshong, 2009). Practice hour data from 2018 was utilized as this was readily
available from the Association from Social Work Boards. Practice hours is a continuous variable.
It is noted that the use of this data presented a temporal issue as collection postdated the
dependent variable. This limitation is further discussed in Chapter Five.

Supervision Hours
Supervision hours are number of hours of direct supervision a post-graduate social
worker has before licensure. Supervision must take place according to state law, typically done
by an independent licensed social worker or qualified supervisor (Association of Social Work
Boards, 2014; Groshong, 2009). Supervision hour data from 2018 was utilized as this data was
available from the Association for Social Work Boards. This is a continuous variable. As with
practice hours, the use of this data potentially created a temporal issue. This is discussed in the
limitations section of Chapter Five.
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Licensure Oversight
Licensure oversight is primarily the responsibility of an oversight entity, such as a board.
Currently, there are three types of oversight entity: an independent board of social work, a
composite board, and administrative body oversight (Association of Social Work Boards, 2016b;
Groshong, 2009). Board composition is determined by the professional members that constitute
the respective board. In this instance, an independent board of social work consists of only social
workers. In contrast, a composite board consists of a variety of professionals and clients. For
example, the State of Florida combines mental health counselors, marriage and family therapists,
clinical social workers, and lay citizens to form the Board of Clinical Social Work, Marriage &
Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling (Florida Board of Clinical Social Work,
Marriage & Family Therapy, and Mental Health Counseling, n.d.). Agency oversight indicates
that there is no independent board present (Groshong, 2009). For Part III, licensure oversight is
measured by count data. For Part IV of this study, licensure oversight is coded with zero
indicating an independent social work board and one indicating a composite board or
administrative agency oversight.

Control Variables

Year of Licensure Law Enactment
This variable measures the year that clinical social work licensing laws were first passed
in the respective state. Many states passed policies implementing a certification for social
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workers as a precursor to licensure. This variable only accounts for the actual year that licensure
laws were passed (Groshong, 2009).

Number of Licensed Clinical Social Workers
A continuous variable, this measures the number of licensed clinical social workers in a
receptive state as reported by the state or ASWB. The number of licensed clinical social workers
in each state was obtained in 2018. States were unable/unwilling to provide historical numbers
for licensed clinical social workers.

Data Analysis
IBM© SPSS© Statistics Version 24 was used for quantitative data analysis. Univariate
descriptive statistics were used to provide a preliminary analysis of the data. Bivariate statistics
were employed to examine relationships between the dependent and independent variables. To
test the hypotheses, regression was conducted.
Quantitative data analysis occurred in four parts. Parts I and II tested the relationship
between socioeconomic and political characteristics and the regulatory characteristics of social
work practice hours and social work supervision hours. Multiple linear regression was used to
test the relationship between independent variables and social work practice hours and social
work supervision hours. For Part III, count data was used to ascertain the states’ preferences for
social work board type. Part IV tested the relationship between socioeconomic, political, and
regulatory variables and the number of state sanctions for clinical social workers.
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Multiple Linear Regression
Multiple linear regression is an appropriate statistical tool when the dependent (outcome)
variable is continuous (Creswell, 2009; Field, 2014). Before completing the regression analysis,
the data were reviewed to ensure a lack of multicollinearity, as demonstrated through the
variance inflation factor (VIF) score. The coefficient of determination (adjusted R 2) was
analyzed to determine the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that was explained by
the independent variables. Standardized regression coefficients (Beta) were reviewed.
Probability values (p-values) were assessed to determine statistical significance, with a value of
≤ 0.05 indicating significance, as is common practice in social science literature (Allison, 1999;
Field, 2014; Osborne & Waters, 2002). Multiple linear regression was utilized for Parts I, II, and
IV.

Qualitative Analysis
Within the embedded mixed methods design, a qualitative analysis was conducted to
complement the quantitative findings. A case study approach was utilized as it offers an in-depth
examination of data within a bounded system (Creswell, 2007), in this instance, a state. Three
states were selected for the case study: Louisiana, Michigan, and Ohio. These states were chosen
as they have the greatest number of total sanctions in each of the three political culture domains.
The case study examined various aspects of the political, socioeconomic, and social work
regulatory characteristics. Additionally, supplemental sanctioning information was reported,
such as data on the type of sanctions and adverse actions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents the results of descriptive, quantitative, and qualitative analyses, and
a discussion of the findings, limitations, implications, and paths for future research. The
quantitative results are presented in four parts that align with the study design. Parts I and II
examined the influence of the independent variables on the regulatory variables (practice hours,
supervision hours). Part III examined the states’ preferences for social work board type. Part IV
examined the influence of the independent variables, including the regulatory variables on social
worker sanctions. Part IV consisted of two models, one examining the influence of independent
and regulatory variables on total sanctions and the other examining the influence on the
sanctioning rate. For the quantitative analysis, correlations, specifically the Pearson productmoment correlation was used to determine the nature of the linear relationship between variables.
This procedure is frequently used to detect issues of multicollinearity. A common cutoff point
used to measure multicollinearity is 0.80 (Field, 2014). The variance inflation factor (VIF) was
also used to test for multicollinearity, with a score of greater than five, indicating a high level of
correlation (Field, 2014).

Descriptive Analysis
The population used in this study consists of 48 states. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded,
given that several independent variables (political culture, general policy liberalism, and
interparty competition) were unavailable. Descriptive analysis was used to determine normality
and distribution and develop an overall sense of the nature of the data.
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Initial observation of the data indicates a wide variation in total sanctions among the 48 states,
with the lowest score being South Dakota with 11 total sanctions and Michigan having the most
at 1511 total sanctions (SD = 283.982). The sanctioning rate (the number of total sanctions per
100 clinical social workers) has a range of 29.28. For this variable, Georgia had the lowest
sanctioning rate at 0.8426, while Arizona had the highest rate at 30.1194 (SD = 5.608). For the
socioeconomic variables of population and per capita income, there is, as expected, a wide
variation between the 48 states. Table 2 presents the results of the descriptive analysis.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables
Std.
Variable Label
N Minimum Maximum
Mean
Deviation
TotSanct
48
11
1511
234.08
268.606
SanctRate
48
0.8426
30.1194
5.883023
5.6081176
PolCul
48
1
9
4.9746
2.59815
IPC90
48
0.232
0.831
0.5486
0.151408
GPL90
48
1
50
26.02
14.557
Pop90
48
453588 29760021 5134264.6 5506099.729
PCI90
48
14088
26979
18863.98
2880.997
PracHrs
48
1500
5760
3157.08
734.546
SupHrs
48
75
200
108.27
22.276
NumCSW
48
381
27730
5117.04
5351.799
YrLicLaw
48
1961
2004
1985.25
10.876
Valid N (listwise) 48
Note: interparty competition and general policy liberalism are indices, while political culture is a scale.
Variable Name
Total Sanctions (1990 – 2018)
Sanctioning Rate (2018)
Political Culture (1969)
Interparty Competition (1990)
Policy Liberalism (1990)
State Population (1990)
State Per Capita Income (1990)
Practice Hours (2018)
Supervision Hours (2018)
Number of Clinical SWs (2018)
Year of Licensing Law (2009)

Part I – Influence of Independent Variables on Practice Hours
Part I of this study examined the influence of socioeconomic and political variables on
state requirements for social work practice hours while controlling for the number of clinical
social workers and the year of licensing law. This part addressed the first research question posed
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by this study, which is as follows: What is the relationship between state political and
socioeconomic characteristics and state clinical social work practice hour requirements?
The results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Correlations for Practice Hours
Variables
PolCul
IPC90
GPL90
PracHrs
-0.006
0.204
0.012
***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05

Pop90
-0.166

PCI90
-0.228

NumCSW
-0.178

YrLicLaw
-0.160

PracHrs
1

This correlation analysis yielded no statistically significant results between the
independent variables and practice hours.
A regression analysis was conducted to examine the influence of political and
socioeconomic variables on practice hours. Due to the number of independent and control
variables (n = 7), the analysis was split into two models, one examining the influence of political
variables and the other examining the influence of socioeconomic variables.
Practice hours were regressed against the three political independent variables. The
results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Influence of Political Variables on Practice Hours
Variable
Intercept
PolCul
IPC90
GPL90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.113
Adjusted R2 = 0.007
F = 1.069
Sig. = 0.391

Beta
-0.255
0.333
0.089
-0.155
-0.091

Std. Error
20857.773
56.235
988.664
8.292
0.020
10.429
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t-test
0.712
-1.282
1.636
0.540
-1.043
-0.591

Sig.
0.480
0.207
0.109
0.592
0.303
0.558

VIF
1.873
1.966
1.279
1.051
1.129

The multiple regression model is not statistically significant, F = 1.069, p = 0.391,
Adjusted R2 = 0.007. None of the political variables are statistically significant. Hypotheses IC
and IE stated that political culture and general policy liberalism were negatively associated with
social work practice hour requirements. Though not statistically significant, the Beta (-0.255) for
political culture (hypothesis IC) is in the hypothesized direction. Hypothesis ID stated that
interparty competition is positively associated with social work practice hour requirements. The
Beta of 0.333 for this variable is in the hypothesized direction.
The second regression model for part one examined the influence of the two
socioeconomic independent variables on practice hours and the two control variables. The results
of this analysis are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Influence of Socioeconomic Variables on Practice Hours
Variable
Intercept
Pop90
PCI90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.088
Adjusted R2 = 0.004
F = 1.044
Sig. = 0.396

Beta
-0.157
-0.205
0.061
-0.166

Std. Error
19846.703
0.000
0.043
0.040
9.974

t-test
1.333
-0.576
-1.220
0.208
-1.124

Sig.
0.190
0.567
0.229
0.837
0.267

VIF
3.494
1.335
4.073
1.029

This model was not statistically significant, F = 1.044, p = 0.396, Adjusted R2 = 0.004.
As with the previous model, no variables were statistically significant predictors. Hypotheses I A
and IB stated that state population and state per capita income were positively associated with
social work practice hour requirements. For hypothesis IA, state population had a Beta of -0.157,
suggesting a negative association. For hypothesis IB, state per capita income with a Beta of
-0.205 was also negatively associated with state social work practice hour requirements.
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The overall conclusion for Part I is that hypotheses IA-E are not supported. This illustrates
that neither political nor socioeconomic variables are good predictors of state social work
practice hour requirements.

Part II – Influence of Independent Variables on Supervision Hours
Part II of this study examined the influence of the independent variables on state
requirements for social work supervision hours while controlling for the number of clinical
social workers and the year of licensing law. As with Part I, this part addressed the first research
question posited by this study: What is the relationship between state political and
socioeconomic characteristics and state clinical social work supervision hour requirements?
A correlation analysis was conducted on supervision hours, the political and
socioeconomic variables, and the control variables. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 6.
Table 6: Correlations for Supervision Hours
PolCul
IPC90
GPL90
SupHrs
0.007
0.100
-0.232
***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05

Pop90
0.026

PCI90
0.021

NumCSW
-0.054

YrLicLaw
-0.095

SupHrs
1

None of the independent variables or the two control variables have statistically
significant correlations with supervision hours.
Multiple regression was run to predict social work supervision hours from the political
and socioeconomic variables. As with Part I, the analysis was split into two models, one
examining the influence of political variables and the other examining the influence of
socioeconomic variables.
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Supervision hours were regressed against the three political and two control variables.
The results are shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Influence of Political Variables on Supervision Hours
Variable
Intercept
PolCul
IPC90
GPL90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.074
Adjusted R2 = -0.036
F = 0.671
Sig. = 0.648

Beta
0.041
0.006
-0.260
-0.098
-0.079

Std. Error
646.264
1.742
30.633
0.257
0.001
0.323

t-test
0.681
0.204
0.207
-1.549
-0.647
-0.501

Sig.
0.500
0.839
0.979
0.129
0.521
0.629

VIF
1.873
1.966
1.279
1.051
1.129

The regression model was not statistically significant F = 0.671, p = 0.648, Adjusted R2 =
-0.036. None of the variables in this regression were statistically significant. It was hypothesized
that state interparty competition (hypothesis IID) was positively associated with supervision
hours. The Beta of 0.006 is a zero-order correlation. Hypotheses IIC and IIE state that state
political culture and state general policy liberalism are negatively associated with state social
work supervision hour requirements. State political culture (hypothesis IIC) with a Beta of 0.041
suggests a very weak positive association. General policy liberalism (hypothesis II E, Beta = 0.260) is a weak association in the hypothesized direction.
The second regression model in this part examined the influence of the
socioeconomic variables and control on practice hours. The results of this analysis are presented
in Table 8.
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Table 8: Influence of Socioeconomic Variables on Supervision Hours
Variable
Intercept
Pop90
PCI90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.030
Adjusted R2 = -0.060
F = 0.335
Sig. = 0.853

Beta
0.237
0.084
-0.288
-0.071

Std. Error
620.818
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.312

t-test
0.623
0.845
0.485
-0.951
-0.468

Sig.
0.536
0.403
0.630
0.347
0.642

VIF
3.494
1.335
4.073
1.029

The regression model was not statistically significant, F = 0.335, p = 0.853, Adjusted R2
= -0.060. No variables were statistically significant predictors in this model. Hypothesis II A
stated that state population was positively associated with state social work supervision hour
requirements. State population (Beta = 0.237) is in the hypothesized direction. Hypothesis IIB
stated that state per capita income was positively associated with state social work supervision
hour requirements. State per capita income (Beta = 0.084) is in the hypothesized direction, but
the correlation is very weak.
Overall, the findings from Part II indicate that hypotheses IIA-E are not supported. This
suggests that neither political nor socioeconomic variables are good predictors of state social
work supervision hour requirements.

Part III – State Preferences of Social Work Board Composition
Part III of this study examined state preferences of social work board composition. This
part addressed the following research question: What types of social work boards do states
prefer?
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Count data is reported for social work board composition in the 48 states. As this study
examined a population, not a sample, any differences between the states are real and not an
artifact of sampling error. Quartile one represents the twelve states with the lowest values, and
quartile four represents the twelve states with the highest values for each respective measure.
Table 9 summarizes the overall count data based on board type.
Table 9: Frequency of Social Work Board Type
Board Type
Independent
Composite
Administrative Agency

n
34
12
2

% of States
70.833
25.00
4.167

The vast majority of states, approximately 71%, use independent boards of social work to
regulate practice. Composite boards are employed by 25% of states, with only 4% using an
administrative agency to oversee the profession.
States were grouped in quartiles based on population and compared against board
composition. The results of this comparison are presented in Table 10.
Table 10: Population and Social Work Board Preference
Quartile One
Quartile Two
Quartile Three
Quartile Four

Independent Board
8
9
8
9

Composite Board
3
3
3
3

Administrative Agency
1
0
1
0

Composite boards are dispersed evenly across all quartiles. Independent boards are
dispersed relatively evenly, with quartiles one and three having eight states each with an
independent board and quartiles two and four having nine states each. The two states that employ
administrative agency oversight fall into quartiles one and three. Hypothesis III A stated that
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states with larger populations prefer independent boards. Given the reasonably even dispersion
of independent boards across all four quartiles, this hypothesis is not supported.
States were also grouped in quartiles based on per capita income. This information was
compared to board composition. Table 11 presents the results of this comparison.
Table 11: Per Capita Income and Social Work Board Preference
Quartile One
Quartile Two
Quartile Three
Quartile Four

Independent Board
11
8
7
8

Composite Board
1
4
4
3

Administrative Agency
0
0
1
1

Nearly all states in quartile one prefer independent social work boards, with only one
state in this quartile using a composite board. For quartiles two, three, and four, the dispersion of
independent and composite boards is relatively even. The two states that use administrative
agency oversight fall into quartiles three and four. Hypothesis IIIB stated that states with higher
levels of per capita income preferred independent social work boards. The dispersion across the
quartiles illustrates that this hypothesis is not supported.
When examining political culture, states were grouped by their respective political
culture and the type of social work board. These data are reported in Table 12.
Table 12: Political Culture and Social Work Board Preference
Individualistic
Moralistic
Traditionalistic

Independent Board
11
10
13

Composite Board
4
5
3

Administrative Agency
0
2
0

Of the three political cultures, states with the traditionalistic culture preferred
independent boards of social work compared to the other two political cultures (n = 13). The
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highest grouping of composite social work boards aligns with states with the moralistic political
culture (n = 5). Both states that use administrative oversight also have a moralistic political
culture. It was hypothesized (hypothesis IIIC) that states with a traditionalistic political culture
prefer independent boards. The data supports this hypothesis.
States were grouped into quartiles based on their interparty competition score, with this
data being compared to state social work board preference. These data are presented in Table 13.
Table 13: Interparty Competition and Social Work Board Preference
Quartile One
Quartile Two
Quartile Three
Quartile Four

Independent Board
8
7
9
10

Composite Board
4
5
1
2

Administrative Agency
0
0
2
0

States that fall into quartile four, indicating greater Democratic control, have the highest
frequency of independent boards (n = 10) compared to the other quartiles. States that lean
towards Republican control and have moderately high levels of interparty competition, quartile
two, have the highest frequency of composite boards (n = 5). The two states that have
administrative agency oversight fall into quartile three. Hypothesis IIID indicated that states with
high levels of interparty competition prefer composite boards. This hypothesis is not supported.
Finally, states were grouped into quartiles based on general policy liberalism and
compared against social work board preference. This is summarized in Table 14.
Table 14: General Policy Liberalism and Social Work Board Preference
Quartile One
Quartile Two
Quartile Three
Quartile Four

Independent Board
9
9
8
8

Composite Board
2
2
4
4
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Administrative Agency
1
1
0
0

Quartiles one (n = 9) and two (n = 9), representing states with more liberal policies, have
the highest number of states with independent social work boards, albeit slightly. Whereas states
with more conservative policies, quartiles three (n = 4) and four (n = 4) have the highest number
of states that utilize composite social work boards. Hypothesis IIIE posited that states with higher
levels of general policy liberalism prefer independent boards. The data supports this hypothesis.
The overall results from Part III suggest that states prefer independent boards of social
work, as a whole. States with traditionalistic political cultures tend to prefer independent social
work boards, supporting hypothesis IIIC. Additionally, it was found that states with more liberal
policies tend to prefer independent boards over states with more conservative policies, thereby
supporting hypothesis IIIE. Hypotheses IIIA, B, & D were not supported.

Part IV – The Influence of Independent and Regulatory Variables on Sanctions
Part IV of this study examined the influence of the independent, regulatory, and control
variables on social worker sanctions. This part of the study addressed research questions four
through six, which were formulated as follows:
IV) What is the relationship between state socioeconomic characteristics and state sanctions
imposed on clinical social workers?
V) What is the relationship between state political characteristics and state sanctions imposed
on clinical social workers?
VI) What is the relationship between state regulatory characteristics and state sanctions
imposed on clinical social workers?
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The influence of the socioeconomic, political, and regulatory variables on sanctions was
examined in two models. Model one examined the influence of these variables on total sanctions,
while model two examined the influence of these variables on a sanctioning rate.

Model One
This model examined the influence of socioeconomic, political, regulatory, and control
variables on total sanctions. For this analysis, socioeconomic and political variables from 1990
were used, as these measures predate the sanction reporting period. A correlation analysis was
conducted, consisting of all of the variables included in this model. The results of this analysis
are presented in Table 15.
Table 15: Model 1 - Correlations for Total Sanctions
TotSanct
PolCul
-0.187
ICP90
-0.151
GPL90
-0.185
Pop90
0.403**
PCI90
0.130
PracHrs
0.316*
SupHrs
-0.030
BrdComp
0.142
NumCSW
0.536**
YrLicLaw
0.218
***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05
An examination of this data found that state population (p ≤ 0.01), social work practice
hours (p ≤ 0.05), and the number of clinical social workers (p ≤ 0.01) had statistically significant
correlations with total sanctions. The correlation coefficient for social work practice hours
(0.316) is noted as a moderately weak association.
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Total sanctions were regressed against political culture, interparty competition 1990,
general policy liberalism 1990, and the control variables. The results of this regression model are
presented in Table 16.
Table 16: Influence of Political Variables on Total Sanctions
Variable
Intercept
PolCul
IPC90
GPL90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.340
Adjusted R2 = 0.262
F = 4.334
Sig. = 0.003

Beta
-0.089
-0.032
-0.068
0.506
0.160

Std. Error
6577.23
17.733
311.762
2.615
0.006
3.289

t-test
-1.159
-0.522
-0.185
-0.483
3.938
1.201

Sig.
0.253
0.605
0.854
0.632
0.000
0.237

VIF
1.873
1.966
1.279
1.051
1.129

This regression model is statistically significant, F = 4.34, p = 0.003, Adjusted R2 =
0.262. None of the political variables were statistically significant. However, the number of
clinical social workers was statistically significant (p = 0.000) and had a Beta of 0.506. It was
hypothesized that a state’s political culture (hypothesis V A) and general policy liberalism
(hypothesis VC) were negatively associated with total sanctions. The Beta values of -0.089 for
political culture and -0.068 for interparty competition indicate that these variables are in the
hypothesized direction. Hypothesis VB suggested that interparty competition would be positively
associated with total sanctions. This hypothesis is not supported as the Beta of -0.032 suggests a
negative association.
The second regression analysis in Part IV, Model 1, examined the influence of the two
socioeconomic variables and the control variables using data from 1990 on total sanctions. Table
17 presents the results of this analysis.
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Table 17: Influence of Socioeconomic Variables on Total Sanctions
Variable
Intercept
Pop90
PCI90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.348
Adjusted R2 = 0.287
F = 5.737
Sig. = 0.001

Beta
-0.147
-0.175
0.732
0.173

Std. Error
6138.193
0.000
0.013
0.012
3.085

t-test
-1.316
-0.638
-1.229
2.945
1.383

Sig.
0.195
0.527
0.226
0.005
0.174

VIF
3.494
1.335
4.073
1.029

This model was statistically significant, F = 5.737, p = 0.001, Adjusted R2 = 0.287. The
number of clinical social workers was the only statistically significant ( p = 0.005) variable. With
a Beta of 0.732, this variable accounts for most of the variance in total sanctions.
Hypothesis IVA stated that state population was positively associated with total sanctions.
Hypothesis IVB stated that state per capita income was also positively associated with total
sanctions. Both hypotheses are not supported as the Betas for state population (-0.147), and per
capita income (-0.175) suggests a negative association. It is noted that neither of the
socioeconomic variables were statistically significant predictors of total sanctions.
The final regression analysis in Part IV, Model 1, examined the relationship between
state regulatory variables and control variables, and total sanctions. The results of this analysis
are outlined in Table 18.
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Table 18: Influence of Regulatory Variables on Total Sanctions
Variable
Intercept
PracHrs
SupHrs
BrdComp
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.556
Adjusted R2 = 0.503
F = 10.507
Sig. = 0.000

Beta
0.467
-0.017
0.179
0.588
0.306

Std. Error
5372.949
0.039
1.251
62.897
0.005
2.686

t-test
-2.888
4.415
-0.160
1.665
5.598
2.815

Sig.
0.006
0.000
0.873
0.103
0.000
0.007

VIF
1.060
1.017
1.094
1.043
1.118

This model containing regulatory and control variables was statistically significant, F =
10.507, p = 0.000, Adjusted R2 = 0.503. The Adjusted R2 value indicates that this model
predicted slightly over 50% of the variance in total sanctions. Practice hours (Beta = 0.467, p =
0.000), the number of clinical social workers (Beta = 0.588, p = 0.000) and the year of licensure
law (Beta = 0.306, p = 0.007) were all statistically significant predictor of total sanctions.
Hypotheses VIA-C stated that social work practice hours, supervision hours, and board
composition were all negatively associated with total sanctions. Only social work supervision
hours (Beta = -0.017) was in the hypothesized direction. The model suggests that social work
practice hours (Beta = 0.467) and board composition (Beta = 0.179) are positively associated
with total sanctions. It is interesting to note the positive association and statistically significant
association between social work practice hours and total sanctions. Oddly, this seems to indicate
that as practice hour requirements increase, so do total sanctions. The year of the licensure law, a
control variable is also positively associated with total sanctions (Beta = 0.306). This suggests
that states with more recent licensure laws may have greater numbers of total sanctions. It is
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noted that this variable is only statistically significant when included in a regression model with
the regulatory variables.
The regression analyses for Part IV, Model 1 of this study illustrate that neither political
nor socioeconomic variables are good predictors of total sanctions. Thereby not supporting
hypotheses IVA&B and VA-C. Outside of social work practice hours, the regulatory variables are
not good predictors of total sanctions either. Practice hours are a good predictor of total
sanctions; however, the data suggests that more practice hours may lead to more total sanctions.
Given this, hypotheses VIA-C are not supported. It is noted that the number of clinical social
workers in each state (NumCSW), a control variable, was a significant predictor in each of the
regression analyses in Part IV, Model 1. Given that these analyses examined total social worker
sanctions, it is logical to assume that the number of social work practitioners in each state may
influence total sanctions. The analysis makes explicit the logical conclusion that the more
clinical social workers there are in a state, the more sanctions there are likely to be. To
investigate this relationship further, Model Two standardizes the dependent variable by creating
a “sanctioning rate,” which is the number of total sanctions per 100 clinical social workers.

Model Two
This model examined the relationship between the sanctioning rate (the number of total
sanctions per 100 clinical social workers) and the political, socioeconomic, regulatory, and
control variables. A correlation analysis was completed using all variables in the model, with the
results presented in Table 19.
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Table 19: Model 2 – Correlations for Sanctioning Rate
TotSanct
PolCul
-0.129
ICP90
-0.196
GPL90
0.016
Pop90
-0.198
PCI90
-0.254
PracHrs
0.367*
SupHrs
0.024
BrdComp
0.041
NumCSW
-0.228
YrLicLaw
0.228
***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05
The results yielded by the correlation analysis show that practice hours (p ≤ 0.05) is the
only statistically significant correlation with sanctioning rate.
As with previous models, a regression analysis was conducted to examine the
relationship between the political and control variables and, in this case, the sanctioning rate. The
results of this analysis are outlined in Table 20.
Table 20: Influence of Political Variables on Sanctioning Rate
Variable
Intercept
PolCul
IPC90
GPL90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.131
Adjusted R2 = 0.028
F = 1.271
Sig. = 0.294

Beta
-0.003
-0.150
-0.057
-0.257
0.193

Std. Error
157.573
0.425
7.469
0.063
0.000
0.079

t-test
-1.186
-0.013
-0.743
-0.353
-1.745
1.264

Sig.
0.242
0.990
0.462
0.726
0.088
0.213

VIF
1.873
1.966
1.279
1.051
1.129

This model was not statistically significant, F = 1.271, p = 0.294, Adjusted R2 = 0.028.
None of the political and control variables are statistically significant predictors in this model. It
was hypothesized that political culture was negatively associated with state sanctions (hypothesis
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VA). While not statistically significant, the Beta of -0.003 for political culture is in the
hypothesized direction. Hypothesis VB stated that interparty competition was positively
associated with state sanctions. The Beta of -0.150 indicates a negative association. Finally, it
was hypothesized that general policy liberalism was negatively associated with state sanctions
(hypothesis VC). With a Beta of -0.057, general policy liberalism is in the hypothesized direction.
Interestingly, when the dependent variable is changed from “total sanctions” to “sanctioning
rate,” the relative influence of the control variable, number of clinical social workers, is greatly
diminished.
The second regression analysis conducted in Part IV, Model 2, examined the relationship
between the two socioeconomic variables and the sanctioning rate. Table 21 presents the results
of this analysis.
Table 21: Influence of Socioeconomic Variables on Sanctioning Rate
Variable
Intercept
Pop90
PCI90
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.136
Adjusted R2 = 0.056
F = 1.698
Sig. = 0.168

Beta
-0.008
-0.184
-0.147
0.239

Std. Error
147.49
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.074

t-test
-1.567
-0.030
-1.124
-0.516
0.239

Sig.
0.124
0.977
0.267
0.609
0.104

VIF
3.494
1.335
4.073
1.029

The model was not statistically significant, F = 1.698, p = 0.168, Adjusted R2 = 0.056.
Neither of the socioeconomic variables were statistically significant predictors of the sanctioning
rate. Hypotheses IVA&B stated that state population and state per capita income were positively
associated with social worker sanctions. The Beta values of -0.008 for state population and
-0.184 for state per capita income suggest a negative association.
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The final regression analysis conducted in Part IV, Model 2, examined the influence of
the three regulatory variables and two control variables on the sanctioning rate. The results of
this analysis are presented in Table 22.
Table 22: Influence of Regulatory Variables on Sanctioning Rate
Variable
Intercept
PracHrs
SupHrs
BrdComp
NumCSW
YrLicLaw
R2 = 0.267
Adjusted R2 = 0.180
F = 3.067
Sig. = 0.019

Beta
0.384
0.008
0.140
-0.188
0.340

Std. Error
144.047
0.001
0.034
1.686
0.000
0.072

t-test
-2.441
2.827
0.057
1.011
-1.397
2.433

Sig.
0.019
0.007
0.955
0.318
0.170
0.019

VIF
1.060
1.017
1.094
1.043
1.118

The model was statistically significant, F = 3.067, p = 0.019, Adjusted R2 = 0.180;
however, the model accounts for only 18% of the variance in the sanctioning rate. Hypotheses
VIA-C stated that social work practice hours, supervision hours, and board composition were
negatively associated with the sanctioning rate. In this model, social work practice hours (p =
0.007) and the year of the licensure law (p = 0.019) were the only two statistically significant
predictors in the model. However, the model suggests that four variables, social work practice
hours (Beta = 0.384), supervision hours (Beta = 0.008), board composition (Beta = 0.140), and
year of the licensure law (Beta = 0.340), are positively associated with the sanctioning rate. As
with the model examining the influence of regulatory variables in Part VI, Model 1, the positive
association between social work practice hours and sanctions is perplexing. Additionally, the
positive association between the year of the licensure law, a control variable, and the sanctioning
rate suggest that states with more recent licensing laws sanction social workers at a higher rate.
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Overall, the results from Part VI, Model 2, suggest that political, socioeconomic, and
regulatory variables, except for social work practice hours, are not good predictors for the
sanctioning rate. As such, hypotheses IVA&B, VA-C, and VIA-C are not supported.
Caution is warranted in interpreting the findings from Part IV due to the temporal
challenges created by data matching issues. As previously noted, the data for this study were
obtained from various sources, with some data coming from different time periods. This is
discussed further in the limitations section.

Summary of Quantitative Findings
This study’s quantitative findings illustrate that neither political nor socioeconomic
variables are good predictors for state clinical social work practice hour and supervision hour
requirements. As such, hypotheses IA-E and IIA-E are not supported. Hypotheses IIIA-E were not
supported, with the data indicating that the socioeconomic and political variables are not good
predictors of state social work board composition.
The findings examining social worker sanctions indicate that neither political nor
socioeconomic variables are good predictors for total sanctions or the sanctioning rate, thereby
not supporting hypotheses IVA&B and VA-C. Of the regulatory variables, practice hours were a
significant predictor for total sanctions and the sanctioning rate. Contrary to the hypotheses, the
direction of this relationship appears to be positive, illustrating that as state social work practice
hour requirements increase, as do total sanctions and the sanctioning rate. Given this, hypotheses
VIA-C are not supported.
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The number of clinical social workers, a control variable, was a significant predictor in
each of the regression analyses in Part IV, Model 1. This is a logical finding, as the more clinical
social workers there are in a given state, the more sanctions there are likely to be. However,
when this relationship was standardized by creating a sanctioning rate, the control variable’s
influence was reduced.

Qualitative Analysis
A qualitative analysis was conducted to offer insight into the quantitative results. A case
study approach was utilized to analyze state-specific information that may shed insight into
sanctioning patterns. Three states, Louisiana, Michigan, and Ohio were selected as they have the
highest number of total sanctions based on each of the three political culture domains. An
overview of each case is presented to include information on the state’s political, socioeconomic,
and social work regulatory environment. Expanded sanctioning data is presented, including the
number and types of sanctions.

Louisiana
The State of Louisiana has a traditionalistic political culture, with a value of 8.00 on
Sharkansky’s scale. In 1990, Louisiana had an interparty competition score of 0.828, indicating
that the state leaned more towards Democratic control. However, by 2018, the interparty
competition score of 0.399, indicating a shift towards Republican control. Louisiana also
experienced changes in general policy liberalism during the sanctions reporting period. In 1990,
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the state had a general policy liberalism ranking of 37, indicating slightly conservative policies.
However, by 2018 the state’s ranking was 43, indicating a shift towards more conservative
policies. During the 28-year sanction reporting period, Louisiana saw population and per capita
income increases of 11.00% and 177.88%, respectively.
The state passed its first social work licensing law in 1972 and maintains an independent
social work board. Social workers must complete a minimum of 5760 practice hours and 96
supervision hours to obtain a clinical license. As of 2018, there are 3961 social workers licensed
at the clinical level.
A total of 810 sanctions were reported between 1990 and 2018, creating a sanctioning
rate of 20.45 sanctions per 100 clinical social workers. Of the total sanctions, the majority (n =
604) were reported between 2012 and 2018. The data also yielded insights about the nature of
the sanctions, the associated adverse action, and some basic demographic information about the
offending social worker. A plurality of social workers who were sanctioned were between age 30
and 39 (n = 239) at the time of the report, with most receiving their graduate social work degree
between 2000 and 2009 (n = 322).
Of the sanctions that were levied in Louisiana, the majority, 58%, were related to
practicing without a license or a valid license (n = 468). Other bases for action, with at least ten
reported sanctions included failure to comply with a licensing board order, statute, or regulation
(n = 127) and failure to meet continuing education or reporting requirements (n = 46), alcohol or
other substance abuse that interferes with practice (n = 14), non-sexual dual
relationships/boundary violations (n = 13), filing false reports or falsifying records (n = 12), and
unprofessional conduct (n = 11).
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The sanction data also reveals the type of adverse action levied on the violating social
worker. The majority, 55%, were required to pay a financial penalty or fine (n = 438), while 15%
had a formal reprimand or censure (n = 117). Other adverse actions with at least 10 reported
instances included suspension of license (n = 88), probation of license (n = 56), revocation of
license (n = 16), and voluntary surrender of license (n = 11).

Michigan
Michigan has a moralistic political culture, with a value of 2.00 on Sharkansky’s scale.
The state had interparty competition scores of 0.421 and 0.336 in 1990 and 2018, respectively.
This indicates a slight shift to a more Republican-dominated political environment. In 1990, the
state had a general policy liberalism rank of 11, indicating liberal policies. However, in 2018, the
general policy liberalism rank of 40 illustrates a shift towards more conservative policies. Over
the 28-year reporting period, Michigan saw a population increase of 7.16%. The state’s per
capita income increased by 136.83% during the reporting period.
Michigan adopted its social work licensing regulation in 2004 and has an independent
board that oversees the profession. To obtain a clinical license, social workers must complete at
least 4000 practice hours and 96 hours of supervision. As of 2018, there are 16,286 social
workers licensed at the clinical level.
From 1990 – 2018, 1511 sanctions were reported, with a sanctioning rate of 9.28
sanctions per 100 social workers. A vast majority of sanctions (n = 1049) were reported between
2012 and 2018. Of the providers that were sanctioned, a plurality were between age 50 to 59 (n =
469) and earned their graduate social work degree between 1990 and 1999 (n = 382).
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Of the sanctions levied in Michigan, the largest basis for action was a failure to comply
with continuing education or competency requirements, accounting for 26% of total sanctions
(n = 398), followed by negligence at 14% of all sanctions (n = 206). Other categories with at
least 10 sanctions include criminal conviction (n = 65), violation or failure to comply with a
licensing board order (n = 51), alcohol or other substance abuse (n = 42), sexual misconduct
(n = 41), incompetence (n = 17), failure to meet initial requirements of a license (n = 14), nonsexual dual relationship or boundary violation (n = 10), and license action by a federal, state, or
local authority (n = 10). It was noted that 36% of sanctions (n = 544) were unclassified.
Over 32% of sanctions in Michigan resulted in probation of the practitioner’s license
(n = 470). Nearly 18% of sanctions resulted in suspension of the practitioner’s license (n = 266).
Other adverse actions with at least 10 reported instances included voluntary surrender of license
(n = 71), an extension of a previous action (n = 39), limitation or restriction on the license (n =
38), reprimand or censure (n = 33), reinstatement denied (n = 28), and a financial penalty or fine
(n = 15). Interestingly, for 21% of instances a secondary adverse action, namely a financial
penalty or fine (n = 318) was imposed.

Ohio
The State of Ohio, with an individualistic political culture, has a value of 5.16 on
Sharkansky’s scale. Ohio had an interparty competition score of 0.384 in 1990 and 0.282 in
2018, indicating a shift towards more Republican control. In 1990 the state had a general policy
liberalism rank of 16, indicating moderately liberal policies. However, in 2018, this rank dropped
to 22, illustrating a gradual shift towards more conservative policies. As with Louisiana and
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Michigan, Ohio experienced growth in both population and per capita income. The state’s
population increased by 7.48% over the 28-year reporting period, with its per capita income
increasing by 150.92%.
Ohio passed its first social work licensing law in 1984 and has a composite board that
oversees the profession. A minimum of 3000 practice hours and 150 supervision hours are
required to obtain a clinical social work license. As of 2018, there are 8809 practitioners licensed
as clinical social workers in this state.
Between 1990 and 2018, a total of 676 sanctions were reported, creating a sanctioning
rate of 7.67 sanctions per 100 clinical social workers. Most of the total sanctions were reported
between 2001 and 2011 (n = 358), with slightly less reported between 2012 and 2018 (n = 317).
Of the providers that received a sanction or sanctions, a plurality were between age 40 to 49 (n =
205) and earned their social work degree between 1990 and 1999 (n = 213).
Of the sanctions reported in Ohio, the largest basis for action was failure to comply with
continuing education or competency requirements, which accounted for slightly more than 25%
of total sanctions (n = 170). Other bases for action with at least 10 reported sanctions included a
license action issued by a federal, state, or local authority (n = 98), unprofessional conduct (n =
44), a criminal conviction (n = 44), a non-sexual dual relationship or boundary violation (n = 40),
other (not classified) (n = 36), sexual misconduct (n = 20), filing false reports or falsifying
records (n = 18), and practicing without a valid license (n = 13). Approximately 15% of the bases
for action (n = 102) were unclassified.
Nearly 28% of sanctions in Ohio resulted in the revocation of the practitioner’s license (n
= 186), with nearly 24% resulting in the suspension of the practitioner’s license (n = 159), and
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22% resulting in reprimand or censure (n = 148). Other adverse actions with at least 10 reported
instances included voluntary surrender of the license (n = 79), other license action (unclassified)
(n = 37), and probation of license (n = 18).

Summary of Qualitative Findings
The three states examined in the qualitative analysis, Louisiana, Michigan, and Ohio
present several key findings. As it relates to the political and socioeconomic variables, all states
experienced a shift in interparty competition, general policy liberalism, population, and per
capita income during the 28-year sanctions reporting period.
The majority of sanctions for Louisiana and Michigan were reported during the latter part
of the reporting period, namely between 2012 and 2018. However, Ohio reported the most
sanctions between 2001 and 2011. The three states differed in the type of sanctions reported,
with Louisiana reporting more sanctions related to practicing social work without a valid license.
While in Michigan and Ohio, most sanctions were reported as a result of failure to comply with
continuing education or competency requirements. The three states also differ in the type of
adverse action as a result of sanctions. For Louisiana, the primary adverse action was the
payment of a financial penalty or fine. In Michigan, the primary adverse action was the probation
of the social workers’ license to practice. While in Ohio, the primary adverse action was
revoking the practitioner’s license, followed closely by the suspension of the practitioner’s
license, and reprimand or censure.
The qualitative findings illustrate that state political and socioeconomic aspects have
changed over time. These findings also show that different states sanction for different reasons
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and levy different adverse actions as a result of the sanction. These state-level differences may
further influence state sanctioning patterns in a manner that was beyond the scope of the
quantitative portion of this study.

Integrated Findings
Findings from both the quantitative and qualitative components of this study, paired with
the existing literature, highlight several points when integrated. First, the general lack of
statistically significant findings from the quantitative analysis is noteworthy. None of the
political or socioeconomic variables were good predictors of practice hours, supervision hours,
total sanctions, or the sanctioning rate. These findings appear to rebuke the literature that
supports that political and socioeconomic variables are good predictors of public policy.
However, it is noted and acknowledged that social work regulation is a very narrow aspect of
public policy and that the existing literature does not explicitly examine policy determents and
outcomes as it relates to social work regulation.
Practice hours were found to be a significant predictor variable for total sanctions and the
sanctioning rate. The positive nature of this relationship suggests that as social work practice
hours increase, so do total sanctions and the sanctioning rate. On the surface, this finding is
counterintuitive; however, this may be a product of the feedback process, as Easton (1957) noted
in describing the nature of a political system. As state policies change over time due to
environmental influences, it is possible that a state changed its practice hour requirements in
response to sanctioning trends. While beyond the scope of this study, changes of this nature
could influence the relationship between practice hours and total sanctions. The qualitative
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findings from this study illustrate some of these types of state policy changes; for example, over
the last several decades, Michigan has trended towards more conservative policies.
The qualitative findings also highlight the more overarching changes that have occurred
in the states over time. All states experienced growth in population and per capita income over
28 years. While political culture has remained constant, all states experienced shifts in interparty
competition and general policy liberalism. The qualitative findings also show that states sanction
for different reasons and that the adverse action resulting from those sanctions differs. For
example, Louisiana tends to prefer the adverse action of a financial penalty or fine. Michigan
prefers probation of the practitioner’s license. In contrast, Ohio tends to favor the revocation of
the practitioner’s license.
The qualitative findings underscore the demographic differences in sanctioning trends
between the states. For example, in Louisiana, most social workers who were sanctioned were
between ages 30 and 39, while in Michigan and Ohio, they were somewhat older. Examining
these demographic differences is beyond the scope of this study; however, they could indicate
changes in the regulatory environment, changes in social work education requirements, or
numerous other factors.

Limitations
There are several limitations that merit consideration in interpreting the results of this
study, namely study design and the use of secondary data.
The design of this study is based on research suggesting that state political and
socioeconomic characteristics influence policymaking, implementation, and rulemaking
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processes (Berry 1994; Grey, 2018; Woods, 2004). However, no specific research examining
these influences on social work practice policies and regulations could be located. This study’s
correlational design is limited in that it cannot be used to identify causal relationships among the
variables (Creswell, 2012). The threat of history is present due to external events that could have
occurred during the study timeframe (Creswell, 2012). These events could include state policy or
social work regulatory changes that happened over the sanction reporting period. By way of
example, there is a potential that a given state changed its social work practice regulations during
the sanction reporting period. A change such as this can impact how and at what frequency a
state imposes sanctions. Future researchers may be able to better control for this by assessing
social work practice and regulatory changes over time.
The relatively large sanction reporting period of 28 years is also noted as a limitation;
with that, socioeconomic and political variables that predate the beginning of the sanction
reporting period were used. Another limitation is the population size. This study’s population,
the 48 states, was not of sufficient size to include all predictor variables in one regression model.
To combat this, social worker sanctions were analyzed with the predictor political,
socioeconomic, and regulatory variables independently. This removed the possibility of
examining social worker sanctions in a manner that accounts for all predictor variables in one
model.
The use of secondary data is also a potential limitation of this study. All of the data for
this study were secondary; thus, the fidelity cannot be guaranteed. Social worker sanctioning
data was obtained from the United States Department of Health and Human Services via
National Practitioner Data Bank. The individual states reported this data to the Department. It
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remains unclear how states report data and what quality control measures, if any, are utilized.
Data for the predictor variables were obtained from a variety of scholarly, governmental, and
non-governmental sources. The use of data from various sources and the processes of merging
that data into one data set created additional problems that were not anticipated at the outset of
this study.
Temporal issues were present that may impact the validity of the findings. Attempts were
made to mitigate these issues by using independent variables that predate the dependent variables
whenever possible. Most notable temporal issues are present in analyses that utilized the
sanctioning rate. The number of clinical social workers in a state was obtained from the
respective states in 2018. This postdates the collection of the dependent variable. States were
unable to provide historical data related to the number of clinical social workers in a given year.
Finally, there is a notable limitation in the conceptualization and operationalization of the
sanctioning rate variable. As defined in this study, the sanctioning rate is the number of total
sanctions per 100 social workers in a given state. Generally, the states were unable to provide a
historical number of social workers licensed at a given time. As such, the number of social
workers provided by the state reflects the number of licensed practitioners at the time of the
query. This presents the possibility that the number of social workers in a given state postdates
the sanction reporting period.

Future Research
This study intended to examine the influence of socioeconomic, political, and regulatory
variables on state sanctioning patterns for clinical social workers. While most of the hypotheses
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were not supported, the findings yielded surprising results, namely in the positive relationship
between social work practice hours and sanctions. While counterintuitive, this finding does
suggest that there is a potential for further examination into this aspect of social work regulation.
Future studies could examine this in more depth by exploring the basic practice hour
requirements and type of experience that is gained under the practice hour umbrella. For
example, some states, such as Florida, have strict requirements on what qualifies for practice
hours, while other states are less rigid in this requirement. These types of differences may have
contributed to the positive association between practice hour requirements and sanctions.
Future researchers may also wish to explore the impacts if any, that sanctions may have
on the regulatory variables (practice hours, supervision hours, board composition). As Easton
(1957) noted, feedback is an essential component of a political system allowing it to evolve as
the external environment evolves. With this, it is possible that a state could adapt its regulatory
aspects, for example, by altering practice hour requirements, based on the sanctioning trends
from previous years.
As noted in the limitations, the presence of confounding variables, such as policy changes
that occurred during the sanctions reporting period, may have influenced the findings of this
study. Further exploration of state-level policy changes over time may yield additional results
that may further compliment or explain this study’s findings. Additionally, as outlined in the
qualitative findings, the state-level political and socioeconomic variables also changed over time.
Further investigation into these changes over time is warranted. Moreover, the use of alternative
statistical methods that can better address changes over time, such as a time series analysis, may
be a useful tool for further investigation.
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Finally, the use of additional qualitative methods may be advantageous to explore this
topic further. The case study approach utilized in this study is limited in that it examined only
three states. While the approach did yield some interesting results that highlight clear differences
between the states’ political and socioeconomic landscape, sanctioning patterns and trends, and
adverse actions that result from sanctions, this could be expanded to paint a broader picture of
these aspects with a larger sample of states. This larger sample would provide the future
researcher a more holistic understanding of the nature of social worker sanctioning trends in each
state.
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